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Abstract 
This study examines the outage loss differential between firms that engage in backup 
generation and those that do not. Unmitigated outage losses were estimated to be 
US$2.01–US$23.92 per kWh for firms engaging in self-generation, and range from 
US$1.54–US$32.46 per kWh for firms without self-generation. We also find that firms 
engaging in self-generation would have suffered additional 1–183% outage losses had 
they not invested in self-generation. On the other hand, firms without self-generation 
would have reduced their outage losses by around 6–46% if they had engaged in self-
generation. Further analyses however reveal that, although engagement in self-
generation reduced outage losses, a firm engaging in self-generation may still suffer a 
greater unmitigated outage loss relative to a firm without a backup generator. The 
relative outage losses depend on the relative vulnerability of the operations of the two 
sets of firms to power interruption, and the relative generating capacity of a self-
generating firm to its own required electricity loads. Policy reforms that allow firms, 
whose operations are highly vulnerable to outages, to make a binding contract with 
utilities in order to get preferential supply are recommended. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Despite the significance of electricity for economic development, poor electricity 
infrastructure is one of the major challenges that firms in developing countries face on a 
daily basis. The poor state of electricity infrastructure has undermined the productivity 
and competitiveness of the business sectors in the Sub-Saharan African and South-
Asian regions. The lack of quality electricity infrastructure has been found to have 
significantly reduced firms’ total factor productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Arnold, 
Mattoo and Narciso, 2008; Escribano, Guasch and Pena, 2009), while the possession of 
a generator has a significantly positive effect (Arnold et al., 2008). Indirect costs, of 
which energy costs account for the largest share, contribute 13–15% of the total costs 
for firms in South Asia and 20–30% of the total costs for firms in most Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries (Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran, 2008). It is estimated that the use of 
electricity can raise productivity per worker by 50–200% for microenterprises in Kenya, 
depending on the item being produced (Kirubi et al., 2009).  
 
In a survey of manufacturing firms by the Asian Development Bank (2002), almost 
30% of Indian firms, 40% of Pakistani firms, 41% of Sri Lankan firms and over 70% of 
firms in Bangladesh reported that the poor state of the electricity network was a major 
constraint to their operations. Surveys of business enterprises between 2006 and 2014 
by the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) showed that around 43% of firms in 
South Asia identified electricity as a major constraint.
2
 A similar pattern was observed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2006 and 2010, more than 50% of Sub-Saharan 
African firms identified electricity as the major constraint to their businesses, compared 
to just 27.8% that named transportation as the most critical problem (WBES, 2012). In 
2007, the average Sub-Saharan African firm suffered a loss of economic activities for 
around 77 hours per month due to power outages. The situation is even more serious in 
some countries and particularly when compared with other developing regions of the 
world. For instance, the average firm in Nigeria experiences an outage of 8.2 hours 26.3 
times in a typical month. This translates as a loss of economic activity for 216 hours 
(nine days) on average every month, assuming that there are no palliative measures. 
Meanwhile, the average firm in East Asia or the Pacific experiences power outages of 
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 World Bank Enterprise Survey: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/infrastructure#south-asia--7. Accessed on 
18/09/2014.  
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less than 15 hours per month. Similarly, a typical firm in Latin America or the 
Caribbean only suffers electricity outages of around six hours per month (World Bank, 
2012). 
 
Given the prevalence of power outages, one of the strategies most commonly adopted 
by African firms is to invest in self-generation (i.e. complementary capital). Many end 
users of electricity, from small to large enterprises, now operate small- to medium-sized 
plants with capacities ranging between 1 MW and 700 MW for their own use (Karekezi 
and Kimani, 2002). Self-generation has increased and now accounts for more than 20% 
of generation capacity in some countries in Africa (Foster and Steinbuks, 2009).  
Although the use of backup generators is common among African firms because of the 
poor public provision of power, a number of studies have argued that a firm’s size and 
export participation significantly influence the decision to own a generator (Steinbuks 
and Foster, 2010). However, investing in a backup generator does not always guarantee 
the complete mitigation of outages (Beenstock et al., 1997): a firm may have a backup 
and still suffer outage losses. These may take the form of restart costs or losses due to 
the inability of the backup method to generate and supply the total power load required 
by the firm. Unmitigated outage losses refer to the losses incurred by a firm as a result 
of power interruptions; for a firm that self-generates electricity during power outages, 
unmitigated costs or losses can arise due to inadequate self-generation capacity. 
 
This study examines the unmitigated outage loss differential between firms that engage 
in self-generation and those that do not. We investigate these issues by using data on the 
backup generation used by over 4,400 firms operated in eight African and two South-
Asian countries in 2007. We find that firms engaging in self-generation would have 
suffered additional 1–183% outage losses had they not engaged in self-generation. 
However, we also find that though engagement in self-generation reduced firms’ 
vulnerability to power outages and consequently reduced their outage losses, it did not 
(in some countries) automatically make them more immune to power outages than firms 
without self-generation. The relative unmitigated outage loss differential depends on the 
relative vulnerability of firms’ operations to power outages and the self-generation 
capacity of a firm relative to its required loads. Nevertheless, we find that firms 
engaging in self-generation would have suffered additional outage losses had they not 
invested in self-generation. On the other hand, firms without self-generation would 
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have reduced their outage losses by around 6–46% if they had engaged in self-
generation.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical frameworks. Section 4 
discusses the data. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical results in Section 5. 
The last section describes the conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A number of studies have examined the impacts of poor quality electric infrastructure 
on firm productivity and output growth in developing countries. They all suggested that 
low quality electricity provision significantly affect firms operation and productivity. 
Andersen and Dalgaard (2013) demonstrated that poor power infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa leads to a substantial growth drag. Diboma and Tatietse (2013) 
estimated the costs of power interruptions to Cameroonian industries and concluded 
that advance interruption notices could help reduce outage costs by approximately 20 – 
33%. Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, and Wang (2015) demonstrated that increasing electricity 
scarcity raised the unit production cost for Chinese firms by 8%. Allcott, Collard-
Wexler, and Connell (2014) showed that power shortages reduced average output of 
Indian manufacturing firms by about 5%, but had much smaller effects on productivity 
because most inputs can be stored during outages. 
 
Adenikinju (2003) analysed the economic cost of power outages in Nigeria. Using the 
revealed preference approach on business survey data, he estimated the marginal cost of 
power outages to be in the range of USUS$0.94–3.13 per kWh of lost electricity. Given 
the poor state of electricity supply in Nigeria, the study concluded that power outages 
imposed significant costs on business. Small-scale operators were found to be the most 
heavily affected by infrastructure failures. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) examined the 
impact of poor provision of public capital goods on firm performance in Uganda. Using 
a discrete choice model on business survey data, they found that an unreliable and 
inadequate electricity supply significantly reduced investment in productive capacity. 
Firms invest in auto-generation when public provision is unreliable. The direct cost of 
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this action, however, is that less productive capital is installed. In addition, there are 
diseconomies of scale in self-generation.  
 
Steinbuks and Foster (2010) analysed the determinants of self-generation and its costs 
using business survey data from 25 African countries. They estimated two binary 
choice models of generator ownership and the capacity thereof. They found that the size 
of the firm and export orientation played more important roles than reliability of supply 
in the decision to invest in a backup generator. The study further attempted to compare 
the outage losses suffered by firms with and without a generator. It used the cost of self-
generation as a measure of outage losses for firms with a backup, while outage losses 
for non-backup firms were measured as the ratio of the reported outage loss to outage 
time. The study concluded that firms owning generators suffered smaller outage losses. 
However, the study did not account for the fact that investing in self-generation might 
not entirely eliminate the possibility of suffering from power outages. The implication 
is that the estimates of outage losses for backup firms were underestimated (unless the 
firms were fully backed-up), because such estimates reflect only the mitigated outage 
losses. 
 
We evaluate the (unmitigated) outage loss differential for firms with generators 
compared to those without by accounting for several other characteristics that might 
simultaneously affect firms’ outage losses. In addition, we use counterfactual analyses 
to estimate what the outage losses by a backup firm would have been had it not invested 
in backup generation, and vice versa.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
A simple two-period model is presented below to guide the empirical specification. The 
objective is to show how firms that invest in backup generation (backup firms) may still 
suffer greater unmitigated outage losses than those without such investments (non-
backup firms), even though self-generation helps them reduce their potential 
sales/output losses. The salient features of the model is the assumption that firms can 
invest in backup generation to (partly) cope with inadequate public power supply but 
that this does not mean that they suffer smaller unmitigated losses than non-backup 
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firms, even though they suffer smaller losses than if they did not self-generate. Consider 
a firm that would have an output/sale of size   per hour if it avoided a power outage 
loss (where   is measured in USUS$). Output/Sale   is subject to a loss amount    
   due to an hour interruption in power supply, where   is a measure of the degree of 
vulnerability of the firm’s operations to power outages. The vulnerability of a firm to 
power outages is determined by its size and the nature of its operation which can be 
reflective of the sector in which it operates and the reliance of its operation on 
electricity service. We assume, for simplicity,      (indicating zero outage loss in the 
absence of service interruption), and       (indicating the level of outage loss when 
there is an hour interruption in supply).      and    .     if the firm’s total 
operations are completely vulnerable to power outages.
3
 
There is uncertainty about the availability and quality of publicly provided electricity. A 
risk-neutral firm therefore has to decide whether to invest in self-insurance activity – 
backup generation – in order to mitigate the size of an outage loss should an outage 
occur. Let   denote the kW of the installed generator such that the (unmitigated) loss 
function is: 
         . 
 
The effect of self-generation on the outage loss size is determined via the 
function     , which relates the size of the outage loss to the level of self-generation. It 
is assumed that outage loss is related to backup generation as        , and         
is the loss sustained in the absence of mitigation action. We assume a two-period 
model. In the first period, there is an investment of    in a backup generator, where   
denotes the unit price (US$) per kW. In the second period, there is a possibility of an 
unanticipated power interruption of   hours. The discount rate (%) is          
denotes the depreciation rate (%) of the generator and  represents the maintenance 
cost (US$/kW). On the basis of the forgoing information, the yearly user cost 
(US$/kW) per unit installed generating capacity (net of fuel or running costs) can be 
denoted as: 
 
               . 
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 Another possible condition is    : a situation where the firm’s operations are totally immune to 
power outages. 
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Thus,    is the yearly capacity cost (in US$) to the business of having installed   kW 
of backup generation, when measured in the second period. Assume the generator is 
used to capacity during an outage and that the annual outage times is  , the yearly 
running costs (mainly fuel costs) in US$ can be written as    , where   denotes fuel 
costs per kWh and   is the expected yearly total duration of outages measured in hours 
per year. We assume the constant (periodic) marginal productivity of the backup 
generator is   such that per hour loss (US$) is: 
       ,  
We assume   is greater than   because it is obvious running a backup generator would 
not be worthwhile if the (marginal) operating cost per kWh is greater than the 
(marginal) benefit per kWh. 
 
Suppose there are two identical firms who face the same level of unreliability but only 
differ by the degree of their vulnerability to power outages. At the end of Period 2, two 
possible histories need to be considered for each firm given yearly service interruption, 
 : 
 
Firm 1 
1. The firm invests in a generator and in this case the firms’ problem is to 
minimise the unmitigated outage loss per annum: The yearly expected 
unmitigated outage loss can be written as: 
                                                                                                    
2. The firm does not invest in a backup generator and in this case the firm’s 
unmitigated outage loss becomes: 
                                                                                                                                 
 
At the end of Period 1, the firm makes a decision whether or not to install a backup 
generator. The optimal choice depends on the initial information on the availability (and 
quality) of publicly provided electricity and the firm’s vulnerability to poor supply. The 
condition for installing a generator at the end of Period 1 is: 
                                                                                                  
Solving and rearranging equation (2.3) yields: 
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          or                                                                                                          
Equation (4) suggests that a firm (Firm 1) would decide to invest in backup generation 
if, given the unreliability of supply, the marginal productivity of a backup generator 
(i.e. the marginal reduction in the potential outage loss) is greater than or equal to the 
user cost of self-generation. Similar to this is the extra investment in backup generation, 
which can be obtained by minimising equation (1) with respect to duration of outage: 
                
    
At the optimal level of self-generation, the potential marginal benefit of self-generation, 
   (given the interruption of supply) must be as great as the marginal (operating) cost of 
self-generated electricity. In other words, a risk-neutral firm invests in (extra) self-
generation only if the potential benefit (reduction in the outage loss) is at least equal to 
the marginal cost of self-generation. 
Firm 2 
Following on from the above, the two possible histories for Firm 2 are: 
1. It invests in a backup generator and in this case suffers a loss: 
 
                                                                                                  
 
2. It does not invest in a backup generator and in this case suffers a loss: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
Suppose Firm 1 invests in self-generation and suffers the unmitigated outage loss as 
expressed in equation (1) and that Firm 2 does not invest in self-generation and incurs 
the unmitigated outage loss represented by equation (6). If the two firms are identical 
and experience the same level of interruption but differ only in their degree of 
vulnerability to outages, Firm 2 can still suffer a smaller unmitigated outage loss than 
Firm 1 if its (Firm 2’s) vulnerability to power outages is lower (i.e. if    ), even 
though firm 1 is better off self-generating electricity than if it (firm 1) did not invest in 
self-generation. 
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Proof:  
  
Suppose that there is an hour power interruption, in which case T  . The unmitigated 
outage loss for Firm 1, having invested in self-generation, will depend on the degree of 
vulnerability of its operations to outages and the relative efficiency of the backup 
generator in terms of the generation cost: 
                                                                                                             
Similarly, the unmitigated outage loss for Firm 2, assuming it does not invest in backup 
generation in the face of an hour power outage (i.e. when    ), will depend on its 
vulnerability to outages: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
It follows from equations (7) and (8) that controlling for everything else, a firm that has 
invested in backup generation may still suffer a higher unmitigated outage loss relative 
to a non-backup firm if its operations are more vulnerable to power outages and its 
(investment in) self-generation capacity is not large enough to significantly reduce the 
potential outage loss. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
This section provides the empirical specification in line with the theoretical model 
presented in the previous section. We use an exogenous switching treatment effect 
regression in a counterfactual framework to estimate the causal of self-generation on 
outage losses. A pooled regression is not appropriate in assessing the outage loss 
differential between firms engaging in self-generation and those that do not. This is 
because a pooled regression model estimation assumes that the set of covariates have 
the same impact on firms’ outage losses regardless of their self-generation status (i.e., a 
common slope coefficient for both groups). By implication, pooled regression assumes 
that there is no interaction between the generator ownership variable and other 
explanatory variables, indicating that self-generation only has an intercept effect or a 
parallel shift effect, which is always the same irrespective of the values of other 
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covariates that determine unmitigated outage loss. However, numerous variables might 
have different impacts for firms engaging in self-generation and those that do not. 
The exogenous switching treatment effect regression framework can capture such 
interactions between firms’ self-generation status and other characteristics by 
estimating two separate equations – one for firms engaging in self-generation and one 
for firms that do not—which are specified as follows: 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                              
where  is a dummy variable that denotes whether a firm engages in self-generation 
(i.e., has a backup generator);    and   are the reported outage losses by a backup (self-
generate) and non-backup firm respectively; and    is a vector of firm characteristics 
that are thought to affect a firm’s outage loss.    and    are vectors of parameters while 
   and    are the disturbance terms. 
Although the effects of power outage and other firms’ characteristics can be estimated 
from equations 9 and 10, the equations may not allow us to directly examine the impact 
of self-generation on outage loss for both groups of firms because their characteristics 
could be different. We address this issue by estimating the counterfactual unmitigated 
outage loss level for each group — that is, what the unmitigated outage level of non-
backup firms would have been if the coefficients on their characteristics had been the 
same as those on the backup firms’ characteristics, and vice versa. In order to determine 
the effects of self-generation status on outage losses of self-generating and non-backup 
firms, we compare the expected unmitigated outage losses under the counterfactual and 
actual scenarios. The actual and counterfactual expected unmitigated outage losses for 
backup and non-backup firms are defined as follows 
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where   is the expected operator. Eqns. (11a) and (11b) represent the unmitigated 
outage losses for self-generating and non-backup firms actually observed in the sample, 
respectively, while Eqns. (11c) and (11d) are their respective counterfactual expected 
unmitigated outage losses. The use of these conditional expectations, combined with 
consideration of the self-generation variable as a treatment variable, allow us to 
calculate the causal effects of self-generation on outage loss. 
For empirical purposes, the outage loss equations (9–10) estimate the natural log of a 
firm’s (unmitigated) annual outage loss obtained from the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey.
4
 Similarly, annual outage time   is converted into days by dividing the reported 
annual outage times by 24 hours. The exogenous variables in the outage loss 
regressions (9–10) include the reported (annual) outage time experienced, (converted 
into days by dividing the reported figures by 24), the natural log of annual electricity 
consumption, and firm characteristics such as size, age of business, export engagement, 
sector-specific dummies and regional dummies (i.e. country dummies). However, data 
on firms’ generator capacities, firms’ required electricity loads as well as information 
on how firms run (use) their generators relative to outage times are not available.  
4. Data 
 
This study makes use of a dataset compiled from WBES and collected from business 
enterprises operating in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007.
5
 The WBES capture firms’ 
perceptions of the obstacles to their growth, the relative significance of various 
constraints to increasing employment opportunities and productivity and the effects of a 
country’s investment climate on the international competitiveness of its firms. The 
WBES follow a stratified random sampling method,
6
 and focus on the weaknesses in an 
economy’s infrastructure, law enforcement, public administration and regulatory 
framework. The major advantage of the WBES database is the provision of both 
managers’ opinions regarding the (un)reliability of electricity supplies and the 
economic data relevant for structural microeconomic analysis. 
                                                          
4
Data on outage losses are first converted to US dollars (US$) from the local currency using the market 
exchange rates obtained from World Bank Development Indicators. Then, the obtained outage loss in 
US$ is winsorised at the 90
th
 percentile (upper tail) to avoid measurement errors and extreme values.  
5
 Detailed information on the WBES can be found at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/. 
6
 The sample is stratified on the basis of firm location, industry and size. However, because most 
countries have more small and medium firms than large firms, the surveys may oversample large 
enterprises. 
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4.1 Sample Selection 
The entire WBES dataset comprises information from surveys of over 130,000 business 
enterprises in more than 130 economies. The main analysis in this study, however, is 
restricted to a selection of 2,665 firms from eight Sub-Saharan African countries. These 
samples were chosen to ensure better compliance with the assumptions of the 
theoretical model and empirical specification. In particular, the following sample 
selection criteria were used.  
First, because one of the underlying assumptions of the theoretical framework discussed 
in the previous section is that a firm embarks on self-generation in order to prevent 
outage losses, the sample should therefore be restricted to regions with low power 
supply reliability. One of such regions is Sub-Saharan Africa, where the main reason 
for backup generator ownership is the poor quality of the public power infrastructure 
(see Foster and Steinbuks, 2009).  
Second, for identification, our empirical models require the exogeneity of power 
outages. To satisfy the exogeneity requirement, the sample should be restricted to 
regions where active regional policies that provide considerable public capital and 
create incentives for businesses to stimulate growth have hardly been implemented. 
Sub-Saharan African countries satisfy this condition because the implementation of 
such investment policies has been limited by political instability, corruption, ethnic 
fragmentation and tribal problems (Easterly and Levine, 1997). In particular, frequent 
power outages experienced in the region are exogenous to business managerial 
capability and reflect inefficiency in power sector institutions, which are mainly 
characterised by unreliability of electricity supply, low capacity utilisation, poor 
maintenance, high vandalism of transmission and distribution networks and high 
transmission and distribution losses, among other problems (Karekezi and Kimani, 
2002; Oseni, 2011). 
Third, because our analysis relies on cross-sectional data it is essential that the state of 
electricity supply at the time of the survey be correlated with the quality of the power 
supply at the time of installing a backup generator. Therefore, the sample should also 
exclude developing countries where economic and structural reforms have led to 
significant improvements in public power supply and a considerable reduction in power 
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outages. In Sub-Saharan Africa, despite the introduction of some forms of reform in the 
power sector since the 1990s, only limited progress has been made (Eberhard et al., 
2008). Unlike the other countries, South Africa started experiencing serious power 
outages in 2007 after a long period of high reliability, which suggests that the 
conditions of stable quality are not met. However, the fact that the majority of South 
African firms that reported having a backup generator would most likely purchase it 
during the period of unreliability (i.e., 2007) still satisfies the condition of correlation 
between the state of electricity supply at the time of the survey (2007) and the quality of 
the power supply at the time of installing a backup generator.    
Lastly, to minimise the impact of measurement errors, our analysis was limited to eight 
countries: Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa (reference 
case) and Zambia. These countries were selected because the surveys for these countries 
were conducted in the same year (2007) using the same survey instruments. We 
excluded firms that reported zero outage losses. This was done to exclude firms that 
were naturally immune to outages and those that did not experience power service 
interruptions.  
4.2 Data Description 
This section discusses the variables used for the empirical analysis. Table 1 presents the 
variables at the country level for the eight countries.
7
 In the WBES dataset, surveyed 
firms reported their annual electricity expenditure in local currency. This expenditure 
was converted to US dollar amount using the 2007 market exchange rate. The converted 
expenditure was then converted into electricity consumption in kWh using data on 
electricity prices (US$) obtained from UPDEA (UPDEA, 2009). The reliability of the 
power supply is measured by the number of days per year when firms experienced 
power outages. To obtain this variable, the reported annual outage times (in hours) were 
divided by 24 hours. Thus, annual outage times (i.e., the reliability of power supply) 
indicate 24 hours interruption – an equivalence of a day. The table shows that majority 
of countries had a very unreliable power supply, with an average number of days with 
power outages per annum of at least five. The table also demonstrates that there is 
considerable variation across countries in the average duration of power outages, 
ranging from more than five days in South Africa to 35 days in Senegal, 61 days in 
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 Further details on the variables are provided in Appendix A. 
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Ghana and 110 days in Nigeria. It is therefore not surprising that 86% of the surveyed 
firms in Nigeria and 51% of firms in Senegal owned a backup generator in 2007. 
Despite the relative level of power reliability in South Africa, around 28% of the firms 
surveyed still reported having a backup generator. The data reported in Table 1 also 
indicates that the unreliable electricity supply creates serious challenges for the firms 
operating in Africa, accounting for around 3% of lost sales in South Africa and around 
10% in Nigeria. Even in Zambia, with its relatively stable electricity supply, over 6% of 
lost sales were attributed to power outages. Export engagement is measured by a 
dummy variable indicating that a firm reported exporting at least part of its product. 
Table 1 shows that a sizeable number of firms in our analysis engaged in exports, with 
proportions ranging from 16% in Nigeria to 50% in Kenya.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Country Share of firms 
owning a 
generator 
 
Annual Outage 
times (converted 
into days) 
Annual outage 
loss as a % of 
annual sales 
Engaged in 
export 
Annual electricity 
consumption (ln) 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd Mean sd mean Sd 
Ghana 0.25 0.44 60.67 37.08 7.37 6.64 0.25 0.23 8.43 1.90 
Kenya 0.63 0.48 14.11 18.12 6.07 7.79 0.43 0.50 10.95 2.25 
Mali 0.32 0.47 9.81 18.00 5.68 5.86 0.17 0.38 8.82 1.65 
Mozambique 0.18 0.38 18.18 19.62 4.39 6.37 0.05 0.22 9.73 1.86 
Nigeria 0.86 0.35 110.30 80.98 9.92 10.33 0.03 0.16 8.71 1.27 
Senegal 0.51 0.50 34.67 47.07 8.08 6.83 0.16 0.37 9.44 1.86 
South Africa 0.28 0.45 5.44 11.03 2.70 3.53 0.37 0.48 13.60 1.94 
Zambia 0.12 0.32 8.14 12.56 6.32 8.47 0.25 0.43 11.48 1.99 
sd = standard deviation. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Coefficients Estimates 
Table 2 summarises the results from the exogenous switching regression approach 
described in section 3.2. The first column reports the factors that might affect firms’ 
decision to invest in self-generation.
8
 The coefficients on the electricity consumption 
variable were positive and significant, indicating that firms using large amounts of 
                                                          
8
 This was estimated using probit model. 
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electricity were more likely to engage in self-generation. The effect of firm size was 
positive and significantly increased the probability of self-generation: the larger the 
number of full-time employees, the greater the probability that a firm would invest in 
self-generation. This indicates that larger firms are more likely to own a generator when 
public provision is unreliable. This could reflect these firms’ vulnerability to power 
outages as well as their ability to finance self-generation. All things being equal, larger 
firms that experienced an outage of a certain duration were more likely to suffer greater 
losses than smaller firms that experienced an outage of the same duration. Moreover, 
larger firms were more likely to have access to external funds to finance their 
operations, including self-generation.  
There was also considerable variation in generator ownership across the regions and 
sectors (Table 2). The results thus show that generator ownership was greatly affected 
by firm characteristics such as size, sector, electricity consumption, export participation 
and the business operating environment as measured by country dummy. 
For the outage loss equations, the coefficients on the electricity consumption variable 
were positive and significant, indicating that firms using large amounts of electricity 
were more likely to suffer higher outage losses. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of 
electricity consumption in the outage loss equation for backup firms was approximately 
4% higher (0.32 for backup and 0.28 for non-backup) than the corresponding 
coefficient in the outage loss equation for non-backup firms. This could reflect the 
differences in the energy intensiveness of the operations of the two sets of firms to 
power outages. A comparison of the estimated coefficients for reliability of power 
supply showed that power outages significantly affected firms’ losses. The estimated 
coefficient of the days of power outages for non-backup firms was 1.5 times higher than 
the corresponding coefficient in the equation for backup firms. All other things being 
equal, a 24 hours’ (or 1 day’s) increase in outage time raised annual outage loss 
suffered by an average backup firm by 0.2%. On the other hand, an average firm 
without a backup that experienced an additional one day of outage suffered about 0.3% 
increase in annual outage loss. 
 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, an increase in the number of employees was 
associated with an increase in outage losses. This was evidenced in the estimated 
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coefficients for the natural log of the number of employees working in a firm. 
Regardless of backup ownership, the larger a firm was, the greater its power outage 
loss. A 10% increase in the number of workers was associated with 4.3% and 7% 
increases in outage losses suffered by an average backup and non-backup firm 
respectively. However, a comparison of the estimates suggests that, controlling for 
other factors, larger backup firms were likely to suffer smaller outage losses than larger 
non-backup firms. Country dummies were statistically significant for several countries 
and showed that, when controlling for other factors, backup firms were more likely to 
suffer greater outage losses than non-backup firms. Although firms operating in non-
metals, garment and textiles, as well as chemical and pharmaceutical industries without 
investing in self-generation were more likely to suffer greater outage losses than backup 
firms operating in the same industries, firms in food and beverages, metals and 
machinery, electronics, retails, other manufacturing, and other services industries did 
not exhibit significant unmitigated outage loss differentials based on their self-
generation status. 
Table 2: Regression of (unmitigated) outage losses by self-generation status – Africa 
Dependent variable Backup status                    Outage loss (ln) 
  marginal effects Backup Firms Non-backup Firms 
Electricity consumption (ln) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.32*** (0.03) 0.28*** (0.04) 
Days of power outages  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.002*** (0.0006) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Employment (ln) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.43*** (0.07) 0.70*** (0.07) 
Age -0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) 
Export engagement 0.06** (0.02) -0.07 (0.14) -0.04 (0.13) 
Small*ln days of outages 
  
-0.11*** (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) 
large*ln days of outages 
  
-0.14*** (0.05) -0.09 (0.08) 
Ghana 0.20*** (0.04) 0.84*** (0.31) -0.50** (0.24) 
Kenya 0.34*** (0.03) 0.64*** (0.24) 0.66*** (0.20) 
Mali 0.24*** (0.05) 0.03 (0.39) -0.04 (0.27) 
Mozambique 0.08* (0.05) -0.02 (0.39) -0.72*** (0.21) 
Nigeria 0.68*** (0.03) 0.12 (0.25) 0.08 (0.25) 
Senegal 0.37*** (0.04) 0.81*** (0.27) 0.45* (0.23) 
Zambia -0.09** (0.04) 0.17 (0.41) -0.06 (0.18) 
Garment and Textiles 0.07** (0.03) -0.47*** (0.18) -0.23 (0.24) 
Food and Beverages 0.18*** (0.03) -0.03 (0.17) 0.25 (0.25) 
Metals and Machinery 0.12*** (0.04) -0.11 (0.20) 0.02 (0.26) 
Electronics 0.18** (0.08) 0.49 (0.42) 0.05 (0.51) 
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals 0.16*** (0.05) 0.39* (0.24) 0.61* (0.33) 
Non-metals 0.13** (0.05) 0.4 (0.30) 0.82** (0.33) 
Other Manufacturing 0.07** (0.04) -0.07 (0.19) 0.15 (0.25) 
17 
 
Retails  0.09** (0.04) -0.14 (0.18) 0.33 (0.29) 
Other Services 0.24*** (0.06) -0.22 (0.23) 0.12 (0.66) 
Constant     4.27*** (0.48) 3.23*** (0.46) 
No of observation 2,665 
 
1,648   1,017   
F-stat. 
  
53.77*** 
 
49.10*** 
 
Adj. R-sq 
  
0.42 
 
0.52 
 
Log likelihood -1172.24 
     
Pseudo R-sq 0.34 
     
Prob. Chi 0.00   
    
***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in brackets. Base country: South 
Africa; base sector: Wood & Furniture. 
a
 Days of power outages = annual outage times (in hours) reported by firms divided by 24 hours. Outage times refer to 
periods when public system is not available. 
 
 
5.2 Estimated Unmitigated Outage Loss Differential  
In Table 3 we present the estimated value of lost load per kWh unserved. To obtain the 
estimates, we assumed that an average firm operated 12 hours daily. To obtain hourly 
electricity consumption, total annual electricity consumption was divided by the annual 
operation hours net outage times. We then computed the outage loss per kWh 
unsupplied assuming that a firm would have consumed the same amount of electricity 
per hour during outages as it did during uninterrupted hours – that is, we assumed 
constant hourly electricity consumption during operation times. The estimated value of 
lost load ranges from US$2.01 – US$23.92 per kWh for firms engaging in self-
generation, and from US$1.54 – US$32.46 per kWh for firms without self-generation. 
This indicates that firms in Africa lost substantial amounts of their potential sales values 
to power outages. The results further show that the actual unmitigated outage loss per 
kWh was considerably higher for backup firms than for non-backup firms in countries 
with frequent power outages (Ghana and Nigeria). These results reflect the degree of 
vulnerability of backup firms’ operations to power outages (relative to non-backup 
firms) and the inability of their generating capacity to meet the required loads in the 
event of power interruption.  
There are significant variations in the unmitigated outage losses suffered across the 
countries. For instance, the unmitigated outage loss per kWh suffered by an average 
backup firm in Kenya is around 10 times the average loss suffered by a backup firm in 
Nigeria, despite having larger proportions of firms engaging in self-generation in the 
two countries and a higher reliability in the former. This finding might reflect the 
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variations in the degree of vulnerability of firms sampled in the two countries and the 
relativeness of self-generation capacity to required loads. Because electricity is more 
reliable in Kenya, generator capacity owned by firms might be significantly smaller 
than their required electricity loads. The implication of this low backup capacity is that 
even if firms invest in self-generation, they might still suffer significantly from power 
outages because their installed backup capacity is significantly low relative to their 
energy needs.
9
   
Compared to the grid electricity prices, the values of lost load are considerably greater 
than the grid electricity prices. An average backup firm operating in Ghana and in 
Nigeria respectively lost around 19 and 29 times more than the prices of the publicly 
provided electricity in the two countries. Differences between the value of lost load and 
the grid electricity tariffs were even greater in countries where electricity tariffs were 
lower including Zambia (269 times) and South Africa (110 times), and in Kenya (127 
times), Mali (77 times) and Mozambique (157 times) where firms lost a huge amount 
per kWh unserved.    
Despite the substantial amounts of unmitigated outage losses suffered by the firms, 
however, our counterfactual estimates show that firms engaging in self-generation were 
better off than if they did not invest in self-generation. Similarly, firms without self-
generation would have been better off if they had engaged in self-generation. Firms 
self-generating electricity would have suffered between 1–183% more than their current 
outage loss per kWh if they did not engage in self-generation. On the other hand, non-
backup firms would have reduced their outage losses by between 6–46% if they had 
engaged in self-generation. 
Table 3: Value of lost load (US$) per kWh         
 
Backup Firms Non-backup Firms 
 
  
Country 
A       
Actual 
B 
Counterfactual 
C 
%(B-A)/A 
D        
Actual 
E 
Counterfactual 
F  
% (E-D)/D 
G           
Grid elect. 
price 
(US$) 
Ghana 2.89 3.32 14.88 1.54 1.45 -5.84 0.15 
Kenya 20.29 22.33 10.05 28.89 24.28 -15.96 0.16 
Mali 23.92 30.34 26.84 25.23 23.45 -7.06 0.31 
Mozambique 23.56 46.63 97.92 32.46 27.42 -15.53 0.15 
                                                          
9
 Moreover, many vulnerable firms might not engage in self-generation given the relative reliability. 
Thus, they become largely vulnerable in the event of an unexpected outage.  
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Nigeria 2.01 2.15 6.97 1.78 1.66 -6.74 0.07 
Senegal 6.70 18.96 182.99 25.06 13.54 -45.97 0.24 
Zambia 10.76 14.51 34.85 15.37 10.05 -34.61 0.04 
South Africa 4.40 4.45 1.14 9.30 6.00 -35.48 0.04 
 
 
5.4 External Validity Check: The Case of South Asia 
This study extensively analyses the outage cost differential between firms operating in 
Sub-Saharan Africa who have invested in self-generation and those that have not made 
such investments. In this section, we examine whether the main findings are confirmed 
using a different natural experiment similar to Sub-Saharan Africa. Another region that 
satisfies the criteria discussed in Section 4.1 regarding our theoretical and empirical 
specifications’ assumption is South Asia (i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh). South Asia is an interesting case for this analysis for a number of reasons. 
First, both regions account for the larger proportion (more than 95%) of the world’s 
population living without access to modern energy infrastructure: electricity.
10
 Second, 
as in Sub-Saharan Africa, the main reason for firms to invest in self-generation in the 
South-Asian sub-continent is the poor quality of the publicly provided electricity 
infrastructure (Asian Development Bank, 2002). Third, the reliability of the power 
supply in both regions is very low and reflects the inefficiency in power sector 
institutions. Lastly, and similarly to the situation in the Sub-Saharan Africa, the efforts 
initiated to reform the power sector in South Asia have brought about little progress due 
to political instability, poor overall acceptance, slow adaptation and poor transition 
management (Bhattacharyya, 2007). 
The analysis of the South-Asian sub-region is restricted to two countries, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, due to the lack of a good-quality dataset that meets the criteria highlighted 
in Section 4.1. Having taken into consideration the above criteria, our sample was 
limited to 1,736 firms operating in the two countries in 2007. The data was obtained 
from the WBES.
11
 The empirical specifications for the South-Asian case are analogous 
to those used in the analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa. All variables are as defined above. 
                                                          
10
 For details, see the International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook – Modern Energy for All, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/. 
11
 For further details, see the earlier discussion of the data source in Section 4. 
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Data on electricity prices used for the conversion of electricity expenditure into 
electricity consumption (in kWh) were obtained from  USAID (2009). 
Table 4 reports the descriptive characteristics of the firms surveyed in the two 
countries.
12
 The table shows that electricity supply in the two countries is very poor, 
with power outages per annum of 36 days in Pakistan and around 51 days in 
Bangladesh. Investment in self-generation by firms operating in the two countries 
significantly reflects the relatively poor state of the public electricity infrastructure, with 
56% of firms in Bangladesh and 26% in Pakistan reporting having a generator. The 
information in Table 4 also shows considerable variation in the proportion of sales lost 
to power outages and firms’ export engagement. While an average firm in Bangladesh 
lost over 12% of their annual sales to power outages in that year, power outages 
accounted for less than 11% of the annual sales of firms in Pakistan. Firms in 
Bangladesh were more export-orientated than those operating in Pakistan.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics – South Asia 
  Bangladesh Pakistan 
  mean sd mean sd 
Share of firms owning a generator 0.56 0.50 0.26 0.44 
Power outages (days per annum) 50.84 28.86 36.49 66.09 
Outage loss (% of sales) 12.40 8.34 10.59 11.22 
Engaged in exports 0.39 0.49 0.16 0.37 
Annual electricity consumption (ln) 11.42 2.16 11.13 2.10 
sd = standard deviation. 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients on the factors affecting outage losses for the 
two South-Asian countries. The estimates confirm the earlier findings that larger firms 
and those that use large amount of electricity are more likely to suffer higher 
unmitigated outage losses regardless of their self-generation status. A 10% change in 
electricity use was associated with 5.7% and 4.3% changes in outage losses suffered by 
backup and non-backup firms respectively. Similarly, a 10% increase in the number of 
employees was respectively associated with 5.4% and 5.5% increases in (unmitigated) 
outage losses of the two sets of firms. The estimated coefficients for the reliability of 
electricity supply show that, controlling for everything else, a 100% decrease in the 
                                                          
12
 Further details are provided in Appendix B. 
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quality of electricity was associated with 0.4% increase in outage loss suffered by an 
average firm that did not engage in self-generation.  
Table 5: Regression of outage loss  by self-generation status -  South Asia   
Dependent variable Backup status  Outage loss (ln)  
  marginal effects Backup-Firms Non-backup Firms 
Electricity consumption (ln) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.57*** (0.04) 0.43*** (0.03) 
Days of power outages  0.0002 (0.0002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Employment (ln) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.54*** (0.07) 0.55*** (0.09) 
Age -0.0002 (0.0002) 0.01 (0.003) 0.0003 (0.0005) 
Export engagement 0.07*** (0.02) 0.42*** (0.14) 0.63*** (0.15) 
Small*ln days of outages 
  
-0.02 (0.07) -0.01 (0.03) 
large*ln days of outages 
  
-0.07 (0.04) -0.13** (0.06) 
Bangladesh 0.12*** (0.02) 0.16 (0.18) 0.49*** (0.12) 
Garments, Leather & Textiles -0.24*** (0.06) -1.23*** (0.43) 0.52** (0.25) 
Food and Beverages -0.17*** (0.06) -1.27*** (0.44) 0.44* (0.26) 
Metals and Machinery -0.21*** (0.06) -0.99** (0.46) 0.66** (0.26) 
Electronics -0.20*** (0.07) -0.76 (0.52) 0.56 (0.35) 
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals -0.10* (0.06) -0.66 (0.45) 0.48* (0.28) 
Non-metals -0.09 (0.07) -1.48*** (0.50) 0.36 (0.37) 
Auto, Trans, etc -0.15 (0.13) -1.24* (0.68) 1.27* (0.70) 
Other Manufacturing -0.05 (0.07) 0.76 (0.52) 0.83** (0.33) 
Retails  0.17** (0.07) -0.72 (0.48) 1.19** (0.38) 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.08 (0.08) -2.11*** (0.58) -0.90** (0.41) 
Constant 
  
2.74*** (0.62) 1.71*** (0.40) 
No of observation 1,736   772   950   
F-stat. 
  
48.62*** 
 
56.91*** 
 
Adj. R-sq 
  
0.53 
 
0.51 
 
Log likelihood -710.21 
     
Pseudo R-sq 0.41 
    
Prob. Chi 0.00           
***, **, *, denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in brackets. Base country: 
Pakistan; base sector: Wood & Furniture 
 
Table 6 presents the estimated value of lost load per kWh unserved. A comparison of 
the estimates show that an average backup firms operating in Bangladesh suffered 
smaller outage loss per kWh than a backup firm operating in Pakistan. However, a non-
backup firm in Bangladesh suffered a greater amount than an average non-backup firm 
in Pakistan. The average backup firm in Pakistan lost around 1.6 times more per kWh 
than the average backup firm in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, an average non-backup firm 
in Pakistan lost just 0.78 times the outage loss per kWh of a non-backup firm operating 
in Bangladesh.  
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The estimated values of lost load further show that while backup firms in Bangladesh 
suffered smaller outage loss per kWh unserved compared to the non-backup firms, 
backup firms in Pakistan suffered greater outage loss than non-backup firms. These 
findings further strengthen our theoretical proposition and indicate that investing in 
self-generation may not necessarily make a firm suffer smaller outage loss than a firm 
without such investment, even though the firm is better off than if it did not invest in 
self-generation.       
 
Table 6: Value of lost load (US$) per kWh – South Asia  
 
Backup Firms Non-backup Firms   
Country 
A       
Actual 
B 
Counterfactual 
C  
 %(B-A)/A  
D        
Actual 
E 
Counterfactual 
F  
% (E-D)/D 
Grid elect. 
prices 
Bangladesh 4.73 4.84 2.33 4.83 3.98 -17.60 0.05 
Pakistan 7.46 7.94 6.43 3.79 3.52 -7.12 0.07 
 
 
 
 
5.5 The Empirical Findings Puzzle 
One question that arises from the above findings is why firms that invested in backup 
capacity continued to suffer greater unmitigated outage losses. The reason is simply that 
although firms with certain characteristics have a propensity to invest in backup 
generation, in most cases they make partial investments that still leave them vulnerable 
to power outages. As stated in our theoretical prediction (Section 3.1), the optimal 
choice of the size of generation capacity is determined at the point when the marginal 
mitigation gain is equal to the marginal cost of adding extra unit of generation capacity 
– this point is not necessarily at the maximum. So even in the absence of additional 
imperfections like financial constraints firms may still optimally choose lower capacity 
than full outage protection.  
Reporting on data on self-generation from 12 African countries, Oseni and Pollitt 
(2013) showed that 76–100% of firms that invested in backup generation made partial 
investments and complemented their energy needs with the services provided by the 
national grid. Backup rates (the ratio of installed backup capacity to average electricity 
demand) were significantly below 10% in most of the countries and below 5% in 
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countries with infrequent power outages (e.g. Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia). 
The implication of this low backup capacity is that even if firms invest in self-
generation based on their firm characteristics, they may still suffer significantly from 
power outages if their installed backup capacity is low relative to their energy needs. 
Although larger firms are more likely to invest in backup generation, they can still 
suffer greater unmitigated outage losses than smaller firms if their investments are 
partial and do not cover the larger proportion of their potential outage losses.  
There are several reasons why firms might decide to make lower investments in self-
generation than necessary to back up their energy needs fully. Firstly, firms may decide 
to invest in low backup capacity (to back up just critical components like freezers, IT, 
etc) and complement it with energy from the national grid because it is cheaper. The 
variable cost of self-generating electricity is approximately 3 times as costly as the costs 
of electricity supplied by the national grid due to diseconomies of scale in self-
generation (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010). Another reason for running a lower-capacity 
backup generator could be financial constraints (Steinbuks, 2012). Firms may opt for 
less backup capacity if they do not have adequate financial capacity to invest in 100% 
backup generation. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion  
 
Several studies have demonstrated that firms possessing certain characteristics are more 
likely to invest in self-generation when faced with an unreliable electricity supply. This 
study examined the outage loss differential between firms that invested in self-
generation and those firms without such investments. The natural experiments created 
by the poor quality of publicly provided electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia were used to analyse the outage loss differentials between backup and non-backup 
firms. We first re-examined how firm characteristics may influence decisions regarding 
self-generation. Our findings confirmed the results from the earlier literature: we found 
that firms possessing certain characteristics had a greater tendency to invest in self-
generation. In particular, electricity use, firm size, export engagement and the operating 
environment significantly affected investment in self-generation when electricity from 
the public grid was unreliable.  
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However, we also found that engaging in self-generation might not necessarily make a 
firm suffer smaller unmitigated outage losses (costs) than a firm that did not self-
generate, although self-generation reduces outage losses. The relative unmitigated 
outage losses between two firms (one with a backup and the other without a backup) 
would depend on the relative vulnerability of their operations to power outages and the 
ability of the former to make sufficiently substantial investments in self-generation 
relative to its required electricity loads. Nevertheless, we found that firms engaging in 
self-generation would have suffered 1–183% more outage loss per kWh than their 
current loss level if they had not engaged in self-generation. Similarly, those firms 
without backup generation would have, on average, reduced their outage losses by 6 – 
46% had they engaged in self-generation. 
 
Regardless of investment in self-generation, we found that firms operating in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia suffered significantly from power outages, suggesting 
that firms can still benefit substantially from a cost-reflective tariff that ensures 
reliability. Firms engaging in self-generation suffered between US$2.01–
US$23.92/kWh of unsupplied electricity, whereas firms that did not engage in self-
generation suffered between US$1.54–US$32.46/kWh. 
 
A number of conclusions that inform our thinking regarding energy policy can be 
drawn from the analyses conducted in this study. First, it would be beneficial if firms 
whose operations are more vulnerable to power outages could (or are allowed to) 
partner with electricity suppliers such that they get preferential supply. This 
arrangement could be in the form of a (binding) contract between vulnerable firms and 
the utility companies, such that they are offered preferential supply at an agreeable 
(insurable) optimal tariff but get compensated by the utilities in the events of defaults. 
This would lessen the effects of unreliability in electricity supply on firms’ operations 
and reduce the constraints posed on their capacity expansion by power outages.  
 
The estimated outage loss (value of lost load) shows that power outages impose a 
substantial cost on the economy regardless of investment in self-generation. An average 
backup firm operating in Ghana and in Nigeria respectively lost around 19 and 29 times 
more than the prices of the publicly provided electricity in the two countries. These 
differences between the estimated value of lost load and the grid electricity tariffs were 
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even greater in Zambia (269 times), South Africa (110 times), Kenya (127 times), Mali 
(77 times) and Mozambique (157 times). The value of lost load per annum net of grid 
electricity costs would be sufficiently substantial for some firms to expand their 
operations and increase employment opportunities. This suggests that a stable 
electricity supply may have a strong and positive impact on poverty reduction and 
economic activity. One policy measure is to withdraw subsidies and introduce optimal 
tariffs that are cost recovering for new grid investment and incentive regulation for 
reliability in order to encourage private sector participation in the provision of power. 
 
This study is not without its limitations, however. The use of self-reported outage losses 
by firms could be subjective as firms may have reasons to overstate their outage losses. 
Although such bias was controlled for by using the winsorised values of the reported 
outage losses, it is not clear whether such errors were eliminated completely. Another 
limitation is the lack of data on firms’ generator capacities, their required electricity 
loads as well as information on how firms run (use) their generators relative to outage 
times. Such information would be relevant to further and more clearly unravel why 
firms with installed backup capacity still suffer significant unmitigated outage losses. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A –The case of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Table A.1: Number of firms – Tabulation by country – Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Country Frequency Share 
Ghana 206 7.73% 
Kenya 345 12.95% 
Mali 75 2.81% 
Mozambique 123 4.62% 
Nigeria 1,331 49.94% 
Senegal 209 7.84% 
South Africa 220 8.26% 
Zambia 156 5.85% 
Total 2,665 100.00% 
 
Table A.2: Number of firms – Tabulation by industry – Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Industry Frequency Share 
Garment and textiles 573 21.50% 
Food and beverages 670 25.14% 
Metals and machinery 274 10.28% 
Electronics 26 0.98% 
Chemical and pharmaceuticals 116 4.35% 
Wood and furniture 150 5.63% 
Non-metallic and plastic materials 76 2.85% 
Other manufacturing 371 13.92% 
Retail 328 12.30% 
Other services 81 3.04% 
 Total 2,665 100.00% 
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Table A.3: Number of firms – Tabulation by size – Sub-Saharan Africa 
Size Frequency Share 
Small: 1–19 employees 1,612 60.48% 
Medium: 20–99 employees 752 28.22% 
Large: 100+  employees 301 11.29% 
 Total 2,665 100.00% 
 
Appendix B – The Case of South Asia 
 
Table B.1: Number of firms – Tabulation by 
country – South Asia 
Country Frequency Share 
Bangladesh 1,086 62.56% 
Pakistan 650 37.44% 
Total 1,736 100.00% 
 
Table B.2: Number of firms – Tabulation by industry – 
South Asia 
Industry Frequency Share 
Garments, leather and textiles 826 47.58% 
Food and beverages 288 16.59% 
Metals and machinery 173 9.97% 
Electronics 53 3.05% 
Chemical and pharmaceuticals 173 9.97% 
Wood and furniture 47 2.71% 
Non-metals 44 2.53% 
Auto, transport, etc. 11 0.63% 
Other manufacturing 46 2.65% 
Retail 48 2.76% 
Hotels and restaurants 27 1.56% 
Total 1,736 100.00% 
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Table B.3: Number of firms – Tabulation by size – South 
Asia 
Size Frequency Share 
Small: 1–19 employees 662 38.13% 
Medium: 20–99 employees 490 28.23% 
Large: 100+ employees 584 33.64% 
 Total 1,736 100.00% 
 
 
